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REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  SAFETY  COVERING 
INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON  THE 
ST.  LOUIS-SAN  FRANCISCO  RAILROAD  NEAR  ADAMSVILLE, 
ALA.,  AUGUST  9,  1919. 

November  6,  1919. 
To  the  Commission: 

On  August  9,  1919,  there  was  a  collision  between  an  Illinois  Cen- 
tral freight  train  and  a  St.  Louis- San  Francisco  work  train  on  the 
St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Eailroad  near  Adamsville,  Ala.,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  death  of  3  employees  and  injuries  to  28  employees. 
After  investigation,  I  respectfully  submit  the  following  report : 

The  Birmingham  subdivision  of  the  southern  division  of  the  St. 
Louis-San  Francisco  Railroad,  on  which  this  accident  occurred,  is  a 
single-track  line  over  which  trains  are  operated  by  time  table, 
train  orders  transmitted  by  telephone,  and  an  automatic  block- 
signal  system.  Between  Birmingham  and  Jasper,  Ala.,  a  distance 
of  41  miles,  trains  of  the  Illinois  Central  Eailroad  are  operated 
over  the  tracks  of  the  St.  Louis- San  Francisco  Railroad,  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  latter  company.  It  was  on  this  joint  track 
that  the  accident  occurred.  Between  Adamsville  and  Coal  Creek, 
a  distance  of  4.8  miles,  the  line  consists  of  a  series  of  sharp  curves 
and  deep  cuts,  and  there  is  no  place  between  these  stations  where 
an  approaching  train  can  be  seen  for  a  distance  of  more  than  1,500 
feet.  Approaching  the  point  of  accident  from  the  south,  there  is  a 
tangent  about  670  feet  long,  followed  by  an  8°  curve  to  the  left 
approximately  800  feet  long,  leading  through  a  rock  cut  nearly  50 
feet  deep.  The  collision  ocurred  near  the  center  of  this  curve.  Ap- 
proaching from  the  north,  there  is  a  6°  curve  to  the  left,  about  800  feet 
in  length,  followed  by  the  8°  curve  to  the  right  on  which  the  collision 
occurred.  The  range  of  vision  of  engine  crews  is  less  than  200  feet. 
The  grade  is  approximately  1  per  cent  descending  for  northbound 
trains.    At  the  time  of  the  accident  the  weather  was  clear. 

The  trains  involved  in  this  accident  were  St.  Louis-San  Francisco 
work  extra  1622  and  Illinois  Central  extra  1736.  Extra  1622  con- 
sisted of  locomotive  1622,  5  empty  flat  cars,  and  a  caboose,  in  charge 
of  Conductor  Bazemore  and  Engineman  McGowan.    This  train  had 

149524—19 


U.S.  PEPoJflTOKY  J 

INTEESTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 


2  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION    REPORTS. 

been  working  in  the  vicinity  of  mile  post  719,  between  Adamsville 
and  Coal  Creek,  under  authority  of  train  order  No.  5,  reading  as 
follows : 

Engine  1622  work  6  a.  m.  to  S.30  p.  m.  between  Pratt  City  and  Dora,  pro- 
tecting against  second  and  third  class  trains.  All  trains  north  except  first 
class  wait  at  Adamsville  until  9  a.  in. 

Pratt  City  and  Dora  are  located  south  and  north,  respectively,  of 
the  territory  involved  in  this  accident.  One  flagman  of  extra  1622 
was  stationed  at  Coal  Creek  and  another  at  Adamsville,  the  latter 
flagman  having  verbal  instructions  to  inform  all  except  passenger 
trains  to  proceed  under  control,  expecting  to  find  the  work  extra  at 
any  point  between  Adamsville  and  Coal  Creek.  At  about  3.20  p.  m., 
while  at  Coal  Creek  allowing  southbound  extra  1619  to  pass,  Con- 
ductor Bazemore  called  the  dispatcher  over  the  telephone  and  in- 
quired as  to  the  next  train  north  and  was  told  that  there  would  be 
nothing  ahead  of  train  No.  926,  a  first-class  train  due  out  of  Adams- 
ville at  4.48  p.  m.  The  crew  then  decided  to  go  to  Adamsville  for 
train  No.  926.  The  work  extra  accordingly  followed  extra  1619  out 
of  Coal  Creek,  the  entire  train  being  operated  backing  up,  passed  the 
two  block  signals  between  Coal  Creek  and  Adamsville,  both  of  which 
displayed  caution  indications,  and  was  proceeding  at  a  rate  of  speed 
between  6  and  8  miles  an  hour  when  it  collided  with  extra  1736. 

Northbound  extra  1736  consisted  of  Illinois  Central  locomotive 
1736  and  a  caboose,  in  charge  of  Conductor  Hargett  and  Engineman 
Parker.  At  Pratt  City,  the  Birmingham  terminal  for  Illinois  Cen- 
tral freight  trains,  the  crew  received  a  copy  of  train  order  No.  5, 
previously  quoted.  Extra  1736  left  Pratt  City  at  3.40  p.  m.  and 
arrived  at  Adamsville  at  4.15  p.  m.,  taking  the  siding  to  meet  south- 
bound extra  1619.  While  on  the  siding,  the  engineman  was  notified 
verbally  by  the  flagman  of  the  work  extra  that  that  train  was  work- 
ing near  milepost  719,  3  miles  north  of  Adamsville,  but  to  run  care- 
fully, expecting  to  find  the  train  anywhere  between  Adamsville  and 
Coal  Creek.  As  soon  as  extra  1619  passed  Adamsville,  or  about 
4.25  p.  m.,  extra  1736  headed  out  upon  the  main  line  and  on  reach- 
ing signal  721.4,  located  just  north  of  the  north  passing-track  switch, 
found  it  to  be  in  the  stop  position.  The  engineman  did  not  stop, 
but  proceeded  at  reduced  speed  of  about  6  miles  an  hour  and  sounded 
the  whistle  several  times  between  the  signal  and  the  point  of  acci- 
dent. When  the  engineman  of  extra  1736  saw  the  work  extra  com- 
ing around  the  curve  he  made  an  emergency  application  of  the 
brakes  and,  according  to  the  statements  of  the  crew,  had  brought 
his  train  to  a  stop  before  it  was  struck  by  the  caboose  of  the  work 
extra,  the  collision  occurring  at  4.30  p.  m. 

The  caboose  of  the  work  extra  and  the  flat  car  next  to  it  were 
badly  damaged,  the  body  of  the  caboose  coming  to  rest  on  top  of 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  ADAMSVILLE,   ALA.  3 

the  wreckage  of  the  flat  car.  Engine  1736  was  not  derailed,  but  had 
the  pilot  broken  off,  the  pilot  beam  broken,  and  the  headlight 
knocked  off.  The  track  was  not  damaged.  The  three  employees 
killed  and  all  but  two  of  the  injured  were  riding  on  the  flat  car. 

Conductor  Bazemore,  of  the  work  extra,  stated  that  he  had  one 
flagman  stationed  at  Adamsville  and  one  at  Coal  Creek,  the  former 
with  oral  instructions  and  the  latter  with  written  instructions.  Flag- 
man McCormick,  stationed  at  Adamsville,  was  instructed  to  advise 
all  trains  except  passenger  trains  to  proceed  into  that  territory  under 
control,  expecting  to  find  extra  1622  working  at  any  point  between 
Adamsville  and  Coal  Creek,  but  not  to  designate  any  definite  point. 
The  conductor  said  he  told  the  flagman  that  he  wanted  him  to  im- 
press upon  enginemen  that  they  were  liable  to  find  his  train  at  any 
place  between  Adamsville  and  Coal  Creek.  He  called  the  dispatcher 
by  telephone  from  Coal  Creek  at  about  3.20  p.  m.,  asked  for  a  line-up, 
and  was  informed  that  the  first  northbound  train  would  be  No.  926, 
due  out  of  Adamsville  at  4.18  p.  m.  He  then  advised  his  engineman 
of  this  fact,  also  that  southbound  extra  1619,  the  connection  of  train 
No.  135,  would  be  out  of  Coal  Creek  at  about  3.45  p.  m.,  that  they 
were  not  to  delay  that  train,  and  that  they  would  follow  extra  1619 
to  Adamsville  and  there  await  train  No.  926.  He  stated  that  the 
dispatcher  informed  him  that  the  engine  of  extra  1619  was  in  poor 
condition  and  therefore  not  to  delay  that  train  on  the  hill,  otherwise 
he  would  have  placed  a  flagman  on  extra  1619  to  protect  the  move- 
ment of  the  work  extra  to  Adamsville.  After  extra  1619  passed  Coal 
Creek  the  work  extra  departed,  at  about  4.05  p.  m.,  having  waited 
until  signal  717.7,  near  the  south  passing  track  switch,  went  from 
stop  to  caution.  The  first  block  signal  south  of  Coal  Creek  was 
displaying  a  stop  indication  and  they  slowed  down,  but  just  before 
they  got  to  it,  it  went  to  caution,  as  did  the  next  signal,  No.  720.1, 
the  last  southbound  signal  passed  previous  to  the  collision.  With 
two  section  foremen  Conductor  Bazemore  was  riding  on  the  rear 
platform  of  the  caboose.  He  estimated  that  the  train  was  proceed- 
ing at  a  speed  of  7  or  8  miles  an  hour  when  he  saw  the  engine  of 
extra' 1736  approaching  around  the  curve  about  200  feet  distant  and 
moving  at  a  speed  he  estimated  at  10  or  12  miles  an  hour.  He  at- 
tempted to  reach  the  air  hose  and  apply  the  brakes,  but  was  pushed 
away  from  it  by  one  of  the  section  foremen  getting  off. 

Bulletin  No.  191,  issued  by  the  superintendent  of  the  southern 
division  of  the  St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Railroad,  under  date  of  De- 
cember 5,  1918,  reads  in  part  as  follows : 

When  conductors  on  work  trains  drop  off  flags  to  one  or  both  directions 
where  they  are  at  work,  and  who  leave  with  these  flagmen  written  flagging 
instructions  to  other  trains  to  look  out  for  them,  they  must  not  have  these 
Instructions  to  read  to  the  approaching  train  to  disregard  the  block;  when 


4  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION  REPORTS. 

the  approaching  train  receives  these  written  flagging  instructions  he  must  on 
arrival  at  block  which  is  against  him,  flag  through  this  territory  until  the  work 
train  is  found.  After  closing  in  upon  work  train  he  may  flag  on  work  train 
to  next  passing  track  where  his  clear  block  is  found.     *     *     * 

*  *  *  Instructions  are  intended  to  avoid  the  indiscriminate  use  of  flag- 
ging instructions  by  conductors  authorizing  the  ignoring  of  the  blocks  which 
they  have  no  right  to  do  and  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  trains  which  appear  to 
be  under  control  colliding  with  work  trains  which  might  be  moving  within 
work  limits. 

Bulletin  No.  310,  issued  by  the  same  authority  under  date  of 
April  21,  1919,  reads  as  follows: 

All  engineers: 

Please  be  governed  by  the  following  instructions : 

When  a  flag  is  at  a  red  block  with  written  instructions,  the  instructions  will 
carry  the  engineer  through  from  this  red  block  to  the  next  red  block,  but  an 
intervening  red  block  must  not  be  passed.  It  will  be  necessary  to  flag  through 
that  territory.  Conductors  will  be  governed  accordingly  and  where  possible 
to  do  so,  place  their  flag  with  written  instructions  at  a  point  where  there 
will  be  no  intervening  block  between  where  the  flag  is  located  and  where  the 
work  train  is  to  be  driven  into  the  passing  track  or  clear. 

Conductor  Bazemore  stated  that  he  had  seen  Bulletin  No.  191  on 
the  bulletin  boards  at  Dora  and  Birmingham,  but  had  not  seen  Bul- 
letin No.  310.  He  also  said  that,  according  to  his  understanding  of 
the  rules,  a  train  order  was  required  for  the  movement  of  his  train 
under  the  existing  circumstances,  but  that  it  had  been  his  custom  to 
act  on  a  verbal  line-up  received  from  the  dispatcher. 

Engineman  McGowan,  of  the  work  extra,  stated  that  he  was  ac- 
quainted with  the  instructions  given  the  flagman  at  Adamsville,  was 
with  Conductor  Bazemore  in  the  telephone  booth  at  Coal  Creek  while 
the  conductor  was  talking  with  the  dispatcher,  and  was  told  that 
there  would  be  nothing  ahead  of  train  No.  926.  After  this  conversa- 
tion they  agreed  that  they  would  follow  extra  1619  south  to  Adams- 
ville for  train  No.  926  on  the  information  given  them,  and  he  thought 
that  seven  or  eight  minutes  elapsed  before  they  followed  extra  1619 
out  of  Coal  Creek.  He  stated  that  he  proceeded  at  a  speed  of  from 
6  to  10  miles  an  hour,  observed  all  of  the  block  signals  as  he  ap- 
proached them,  and  that  they  displayed  caution  indications.  He  did 
not  see  extra  1736  approaching,  and  was  working  steam  when  the 
collision  occurred,  at  which  time  the  speed  of  his  train  was  between 
6  and  8  miles  an  hour.  He  stated  that  he  had  seen  Bulletin  No.  191 
on  two  bulletin  boards,  but  did  not  know  of  Bulletin  No.  310  before 
the  accident. 

Flagman  McCormick,  of  extra  1622,  stated  that  he  saw  the  orders 
under  which  they  were  working  on  the  day  of  the  accident,  and  that 
Conductor  Bazemore  placed  him  at  Adamsville  station  after  ver- 
bally instructing  him  to  inform  all  northbound  trains  except  first- 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   ADAMSVILLE,   ALA.  5 

class  that  extra  1622  was  working  between  Adamsville  and  Coal  Creek 
and  was  likely  to  be  anywhere  between  the  two  stations.  When  in- 
structed by  his  conductor,  he  did  not  ask  that  these  instructions  be 
in  writing,  although  he  knew  the  rules  so  prescribed.  Extra  1736 
was  in  the  passing  track  at  Adamsville  when  he  flagged  it  and  got  up 
on  the  engine  to  give  the  engineman  instructions,  informing  him  that 
extra  1622  was  working  between  Adamsville  and  Coal  Creek,  to  look 
for  them  at  Mile  Post  719-10,  and  to  have  them  let  him  by  at  Coal 
Creek,  but  that  they  might  be  encountered  anywhere  between  the 
two  stations ;  he  said  nothing  to  the  engineman  about  the  block  sig- 
nals. He  stated  that  he  had  seen  Bulletin  No.  191,  but  had  not  seen 
Bulletin  No.  310. 

Section  Foremen  Goldsby,  Gum,  and  Mullins,  who  were  riding  on 
the  rear  platform  of  the  caboose  of  the  work  extra,  gave  various 
estimates  concerning  the  speed  of  extra  1736  when  it  was  first  seen 
by  them,  their  estimates  ranging  from  10  to  20  miles  an  hour;  two 
of  them  stated  that  extra  1736  was  in  motion  when  the  collision 
occurred.  All  agreed  that  the  work  extra  was  not  moving  over  8 
miles  an  hour  at  the  time  of  the  collision,  and  all  corroborated  the 
conductor's  testimony  that  the  block  signals  were  at  caution  when 
passed. 

Engineman  Parker,  of  extra  1736,  stated  that  while  his  train 
was  in  the  passing  siding  at  Adamsville  and  before  extra  1619 
passed,  the  flagman  of  the  work  extra,  after  flagging  him,  got  up  on 
the  engine  and  informed  him  that  the  work  extra  was  at  milepost 
719  and  to  proceed  to  where  the  work  train  was  located  and  have 
that  train  go  to  Coal  Creek  to  let  them  by,  but  to  look  for  the 
extra  anywhere  else  on  the  main  line,  as  it  might  have  moved  from 
milepost  719.  Extra  1619  left  Adamsville  at  4.24  p.  m.,  and  im- 
mediately upon  its  departure  extra  1736  pulled  out  of  the  siding 
upon  the  main  line,  at  4.25  p.  m.  He  stated  that  when  he  reached 
the  northbound  signal  just  north  of  the  north  passing  track  switch, 
No.  721.4,  it  was  in  the  stop  position.  He  did  not  stop,  but  passed 
at  a  speed  of  6  miles  an  hour  and  sounded  the  road-crossing  whistle 
signal  twice  between  there  and  the  point  of  accident,  as  well  as  cau- 
tioning the  two  firemen  to  keep  a  careful  watch.  Just  as  the  engine 
started  around  the  curve,  both  firemen  called  to  him  that  the  work 
extra  was  coining,  and  he  immediately  applied  the  brakes  in  emer- 
gency and  reversed  the  engine,  bringing  it  to  a  stop  before  it  was 
struck  by  extra  1622.  He  further  stated  that  he  considered  that 
he  had  a  right  to  pass  signal  721.4  at  danger  on  the  instructions  he 
had  received  from  the  flagman  of  extra  1622,  and  produced  a  copy 
of  bulletin  No.  310  as  his  authority,  but  later  he  admitted  that  he 
had  never  seen  this  bulletin  prior  to  the  accident  and  did  not  know 


6  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION   REPORTS. 

that  it  had  been  issued,  neither  had  he  seen  bulletin  No.  191  until 
after  the  accident,  and  he  did  not  think  these  bulletins  had  been 
posted  on  the  bulletin  boards  to  which  he  had  access.  Having  seen 
neither  of  these  bulletins,  the  only  instructions  he  had,  therefore, 
were  those  contained  in  the  book  of  rules,  and  he  stated  that,  as  it 
had  been  customary  to  pass  red  blocks,  he  had  inquired  and  was  told 
that  there  was  authority  for  the  practice.  Under  the  book  of  rules 
trains  in  single-track  territory  are  required  to  stop  five  minutes  at  a 
red  block  and  then  proceed  under  flag  protection.  This  rule,  No. 
971,  reads  as  follows: 

Trains  on  single  track  finding  signal  in  stop  position  will  stop  before  enter- 
ing block,  and  immediately  send  flagman  in  advance,  wait  full  5  minutes,  and 
then  follow  flag  through  the  block  under  control. 

Conductor  Hargett,  of  extra  1736,  stated  that  he  saw  the  flagman 
of  the  work  extra  at  Adamsville,  but  did  not  talk  to  him  or  know 
why  he  was  there,  neither  did  he  make  any  inquiry  concerning  him. 
The  speed  of  his  train  after  leaving  Adamsville  was  8  or  10  miles 
an  hour.  He  heard  the  engineman  sound  two  road-crossing  signals, 
but  did  not  notice  the  indications  of  the  automatic  signals  as  he  was 
busy  figuring  on  where  to  meet  an  opposing  passenger  train.  His 
first  intimation  of  the  accident  was  when  he  noticed  the  engineman 
applying  the  air  in  emergency ;  the  train  had  been  brought  to  a  stop 
when  the  collision  occurred.  He  had  not  seen  either  Bulletin  No. 
310  or  No.  191  before  the  accident,  but  said  a  copy  of  the  former  bu- 
letin  was  mailed  to  him  afterwards.  He  had  been  on  engines  which 
passed  red  blocks  on  flagmen's  verbal  instructions.  He  had  no  au- 
thority for  doing  so  except  custom,  and  he  said  that  in  this  case  he 
would  not  have  sent  a  flag  ahead  had  he  known  he  was  passing  a 
stop  signal. 

Flagman  Allen,  of  extra  1736,  stated  that  he  saw  the  flagman 
get  on  the  engine  at  Adamsville,  and  thought  he  was  flagging  the 
work  extra.  He  did  not  know  what  instructions  the  flagman  gave 
Engineman  Parker  and  did  not  see  the  position  of  the  northbound 
signal  at  the  north  switch  at  Adamsville.  The  speed  leaving  Adams- 
ville did  not  exceed  10  miles  an  hour  and  he  thought  Engineman 
Parker  had  reduced  speed  to  about  6  miles  an  hour  just  before  the 
collision,  which  occurred  after  his  own  train  had  been  brought  to  a 
stop.  He  further  stated  that  he  had  on  previous  occasions  been  on 
trains  which  had  passed  red  blocks  on  verbal  instructions. 

Fireman  Garner  of  extra  1736  stated  that  he  overheard  the  in- 
structions given  Engineman  Parker  by  the  flagman  of  extra  1622 
to  proceed  and  look  out  for  the  work  extra  on  the  hill,  and  to  run 
by  that  train  at  Coal  Creek.  He  saw  the  signal  at  the  north  switch 
at  Adamsville  displaying  a  stop  indication,  and  said  that  his  train 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  ADAMSVILLE,   ALA.  7 

passed  it  at  a  speed  of  G  or  8  miles  an  hour.  The  engineman  cau- 
tioned him  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  and  twice  sounded  the  road 
crossing  whistle  signal.  He  was  riding  on  the  seat  box  when  he  saw 
the  caboose  of  the  work  extra  coming  around  the  curve  and  called  to 
Engineman  Parker,  who  brought  the  train  to  a  stop  before  the  col- 
lision occurred.  He  thought  the  work  extra  was  traveling  at  a  speed 
of  20  mlies  an  hour  before  the  collision. 

Fireman's  Helper  Striclin,  of  extra  1736,  stated  that  he  heard  the 
flagman  of  the  work  extra  give  Engineman  Parker  instructions  at 
Adamsville  to  go  through  the  block  and  look  out  for  the  work  extra, 
which  would  let  them  pass  at  Coal  Creek.  He  saw  the  signal  at  the 
north  end  of  Adamsville  passing  track  in  the  stop  position.  Engine- 
man  Parker  cautioned  them  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  and  the  train 
proceeded  at  a  speed  of  6  or  8  miles  an  hour.  He  was  on  the  fire- 
man's side  when  he  saw  the  caboose  of  extra  1622  about  250  yards 
away,  and  called  to  the  engineman,  who  immediately  stopped  the 
train.  He  said  on  some  occasions  the  instructions  given  to  engine- 
men  by  flagmen  were  written,  and  at  other  times  they  were  verbal. 

Brakeman  Crawford,  of  extra  1736,  who  was  riding  in  the  cupola 
of  the  caboose,  stated  that  up  to  the  time  of  the  accident  they  had 
been  traveling  at  about  8  miles  an  hour.  He  saw  the  caboose  of  the 
work  extra  as  it  came  around  the  curve  and  felt  the  air  brakes  apply 
on  the  caboose,  the  train  being  stopped  before  the  collision  occurred. 
He  had  heard  whistle  signals  sounded,  but  as  he  was  not  paying  close 
attention  he  did  not  know  what  they  were. 

Dispatcher  Gentry,  on  duty  until  4  p.  m.,  stated  that  the  work 
extra  was  at  Coal  Creek  for  trains  Nos.  1301  and  105,  and  that  at 
3.15  p.  m.,  Conductor  Bazemore  called  him  on  the  telephone  from 
that  point,  and  he  gave  him  some  time  on  train  No.  105.  The  only 
southbound  trains  he  had  listed  were  trains  Nos.  921  and  135,  the 
latter  with  a  car  of  stock,  and  he  instructed  Conductor  Bazemore 
not  to  delay  it.  While  they  were  talking,  the  operator  at  Dora  re- 
ported over  the  telephone  that  train  No.  135  was  then  passing  that 
station.  Conductor  Bazemore  said  he  would  be  delayed  quite  a  while 
if  he  waited  at  Coal  Creek  for  train  No.  135  and  asked  permission 
of  the  dispatcher  to  proceed  to  Adamsville  ahead  of  that  train.  In 
reply  to  the  dispatcher's  question  as  to  where  he  was  working,  Con- 
ductor Bazemore  told  him:  "About  half  way  up  the  hill,"  and  then 
asked  him  if  there  was  any  train  ahead  of  northbound  train  No.  926. 
The  dispatcher  informed  him  there  was  not,  and  Conductor  Baze- 
more then  said  he  would  precede  train  No.  135  into  Adamsville.  The 
dispatcher  stated  that  he  assumed  that  this  movement  was  being  made 
and  at  the  time  he  gave  Conductor  Bazemore  the  line-up  of  trains, 
he  did  not  expect  extra  1736  to  be  ahead  of  No.  926.    He  stated  he 


8  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION  REPORTS. 

did  not  give  Conductor  Bazemore  the  line-up  to  be  used  as  an  order, 
but  would  have  given  him  orders  had  he  requested  them.  He  made 
no  record  of  the  information  he  had  given  Conductor  Bazemore  on 
his  transfer  when  he  went  off  duty. 

This  accident  was  caused  by  the  failure  of  Engineman  Parker  and 
Conductor  Hargett,  of  extra  1736,  properly  to  obey  automatic  block 
signal  indications. 

Operating  rule  No.  971,  as  well  as  Bulletins  Nos.  191  and  310,  is 
involved  in  this  case,  but  these  employees  stated  that  previous  to  the 
accident  they  had  not  seen  either  of  these  bulletins,  and  there  is  some 
evidence  indicating  that  they  were  not  properly  posted.  Not  knowing 
of  the  existence  of  these  two  bulletins,  rule  No.  971  was  the  control- 
ling rule  and  its  requirements  should  have  been  rigidly  observed. 
Had  extra  1736  stopped  five  minutes  at  signal  721.4  and  sent  a  flag- 
man ahead,  as  required  by  this  rule,  the  accident  would  have  been 
prevented.  Had  Conductor  Hargett  been  riding  in  the  cupola  of 
the  caboose,  or  had  he  required  the  flagman  to  ride  there,  he  would 
have  known  that  Engineman  Parker  had  passed  a  stop  signal.  On 
the  other  hand,  however,  he  had  seen. the  flagman  at  Adamsville, 
but  did  not  know  why  he  was  there  or  make  any  inquiry  concerning 
him,  and  his  statements  indicate  that  he  would  not  have  stopped 
his  train  even  if  he  had  known  it  was  passing  a  red  signal.  Under 
these  circumstances  he  is  equally  at  fault  with  Engineman  Parker. 

Engineman  Parker  was  employed  as  a  fireman  in  1903  and  pro- 
moted to  engineman  in  1906.  Conductor  Hargett  was  employed  as 
a  flagman  in  1907  and  promoted  to  conductor  in  1908.  At  the  time 
of  the  accident  both  of  these  employees  had  clear  records.  Engine- 
man  Parker  had  been  on  duty  about  7  hours  and  Conductor  Hargett 
about  6  hours,  after  12  or  more  hours  off  duty. 

The  crew  of  the  work  extra  knew  about  Bulletin  No.  191,  while 
the  crew  of  extra  1736  said  they  had  not  seen  it.  Neither  of  these 
crews  knew  of  the  existence  of  Bulletin  No.  310.  These  bulletins  do 
not  authorize  trains  to  pass  red  blocks  unless  flagmen  are  stationed 
at  such  blocks.  This  was  not  the  case  in  this  instance ;  consequently 
the  provisions  of  these  bulletins  did  not  apply.  But  this  does  not 
alter  the  dangerous  condition  resulting  from  bulletins  being  in  effect 
without  the  knowledge  of  employees.  There  can  be  no  excuse  for 
the  existence  of  such  a  condition  on  any  railroad,  and  the  responsible 
operating  officials  of  this  railroad  should  take  immediate  steps  to 
see  that  all  bulletins  are  properly  posted  and  that  all  employees  are 
fully  acquainted  with  their  contents. 

There  was  evidence  to  the  effect  that  the  crew  of  the  work 
extra  should  not  have  attempted  the  move  to  Adamsville  without 
train  orders;  in  fact,  the  conductor  himself,  in  answer  to  questions 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  ADAMSVILLE,   ALA.  9 

by  the  general  superintendent  of  the  St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Rail- 
road, stated  that  he  was  making  a  movement  not  authorized  by  the 
book  of  rules.  The  basis  for  this  general  opinion  is  not  clear.  The 
work  extra  was  in  possession  of  an  order  fixing  its  working  limits 
and  directing  it  to  protect  against  second  and  third  class  trains. 
In  the  Forms  of  Train  Orders,  Example  H-3,  and  the  explanation 
thereof,  as  contained  in  the  book  of  rules,  the  words  "  not  protect- 
ing against  extras  "  are  included  in  the  work  order  when  such  pro- 
tection is  not'to  be  afforded.  These  words  were  not  included  in  train 
order  No.  5,  and  under  the  order  as  issued,  therefore,  the  work  extra 
was  required  to  protect  against  extras.  In  accordance  with  this  re- 
quirement, flagmen  were  stationed  at  Coal  Creek  and  at  Adamsville, 
between  which  points  the  train  was  working.  The  flagman  at 
Adamsville  had  oral  instructions  to  notify  all  except  passenger  trains 
that  the  work  extra  was  between  those  two  points  and  to  look  out 
for  the  work  extra  at  any  point.  The  flagman  at  Coal  Creek  had 
written  instructions  to  hold  all  freight  trains,  and  to  have  them 
call  the  work  train  in  by  means  of  whistle  signals.  Having  sent  out 
these  flagmen  with  these  instructions,  and  thereby  provided  pro- 
tection against  second  and  third  class  trains  and  extras,  the  work 
extra  had  a  right  to  move  back  and  forth  at  will  between  Coal  Creek 
and  Adamsville,  provided  it  cleared  the  time  of  first-class  trains,  and 
no  order  of  any  kind  was  required  to  permit  it  to  move  from  Coal 
Creek  to  Adamsville  whenever  it  so  desired.  The  conductor  of  the 
work  extra  should  have  given  written  instructions  to  both  of  his 
flagmen.  Failure  to  do  this,  which  is  required  by  the  bulletins  re- 
ferred to,  has  often  resulted  in  accidents  due  to  misunderstanding 
of  flagging  instructions,  and  Conductor  Bazemore  is  to  be  censured 
accordingly.  His  failure  fully  to  obey  this  requirement,  however, 
did  not  have  any  bearing  on  this  accident,  as  the  statements  of  the 
engineman  of  extra  1736,  as  well  as  of  the  flagman  of  the  work  extra, 
indicate  that  the  flagging  instructions  were  properly  and  correctly 
communicated. 

While  under  the  circumstances  as  they  existed  in  this  case  the  crew 
of  extra  1736  is  responsible  for  this  accident,  attention  is  called  to 
the  fact  that  had  the  flagman  at  Adamsville  been  stationed  at  signal 
721.4  instead  of  at  Adamsville  station,  the  crew  of  extra  1736  would 
have  had  the  right,  under  Bulletin  No.  310,  to  pass  this  red  block  and 
proceed  until  either  the  work  extra  or  another  red  block  was  en- 
countered. Had  this  been  the  case,  the  accident  undoubtedly  would 
have  occurred,  without  any  violation  of  rules  on  the  part  of  either 
of  the  two  crews  involved,  and  the  responsibility  therefor  would 
have  rested  upon  the  officials  who  authorized  the  issuance  of  Bul- 
letin No.  310,  for  such  an  arrangement  would  have  resulted  in  both 


10  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION   REPORTS. 

trains  having  right  to  the  track  between  signal  721.4  and  the  suc- 
ceeding northbound  automatic  signal.  Bulletins  or  rules  authorizing 
trains  to  pass  red  blocks  on  single-track  line,  under  any  circum- 
stances without  full  flag  protection,  are  a  serious  detriment  to  safety 
in  train  operation.  Immediate  steps  should  be  taken  by  the  operat- 
ing officials  of  the  St.  Louis-San  Francisco  Railroad  to  correct  the 
dangerous  situation  created  by  the  terms  of  Bulletin  No.  310. 
Respectfully  submitted. 

W.  P.  Borland, 
Chief,  Bureau  of  Safety. 


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UNIVERSITY  6F  FLORIDA 


3  1262  08856  1898 


